I have no problem with not mentioning the whole physical world in our definition.
I would propose however, except of “thought and thing”, to include also a reference to something that is not a thought, but also is not material, maybe in this case “state” would fit?
Dualism is the theory that considers some possible thought or thing or state, to consist of only two different and irreducible origins or categories of the element.
Do you think we should discuss only one kind of dualism of the mind? I mean, only the case of mind described as a sum of properties in contrast to that of matter’s properties, or the case of mind as a substance that is characterized by these properties, but is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, in contrast to matter? Or predicate dualism, which concerns the cases when mentalistic predicates can’t be expressed as physicalistic predicates and explores the difference between something (material or not) and its description as we perceive it?
Do you think that maybe we should also agree on a definition of the mind, here, from the beginning, or leave it for the discussion of the topic, later? In any case, I think that definitions of terms used by the part of dualism which we will agree to explore will be also needed, as for example what mind means, can differ from one person to another. Also, will we accept Leibniz's Law of Identity (x is identical to y if, and only if, for any property p had by x at time t, y also has p at t, and vice versa) to define in which cases the two examined factors will be considered identical and consequently their proposed duality regected?
Alafair, thank you for the link. I found it very interesting (the particular page as well as the rest of the site). But I have to agree with A Smoking Fox, that at the present moment we are seeking a definition, with which we will be able to agree all that it express what dualism mean for us.
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